













	Scientific questions and answers, problems and findings, come in various sizessome virtually trivial but others portentous.  And the difference matters a great deal.  For it is the biggies that figure prominently in textbooks and histories, while the smallies get a footnote at best and silent omission for the most part.  Prizes, recognition, and career advancement reward the big, while indifference befalls the small.
	What matters in scientific inquiry is progress, and this is determined not through the merely numerical proliferation of findings but through their sizenot their mere numbers but the magnitude of their importance in the larger scheme of things.  It is clear that without the distinction between the important and the unimportant at our disposal, mankind could neither adequately understand, successfully teach, or effectively practice science.




	Note, to begin with, that importance in general is a relational conception that connects persons with purposes.  Something is important to someone for something, even as eating a good diet is important to people-in-general for the maintenance of their health.  Now what will concern us here is specifically cognitive and in particular scientific importance in the sense not of the importance of science for something else (such as human well being) but rather importance in science.  What is at issue here is thus the importance to serious inquirers for the proper understanding of nature’s ways.
	People have little difficulty in telling us what is important, but saying what importance is is another matter.  Importance is like pornographywe can generally spot it when we see it all right, it’s the matter of adequate definitions and standards that is the difficulty.  But let us see what can be done.
	Given the inherent significance of the issue, it is surprising how little literature there is on the topic.  Only one philosophical handbook or encyclopedia have I been able to find has an entry under the heading of importance, namely the Spanish encyclopedia of Ferrater Mora.  Its entry is brief and I cite it in full:

	Importance:  see relevance.

Not very helpful!  One of the few contemporary philosophers of science who has written about the topic is Larry Laudan in Progress and Its Problems.​[1]​  He rightly observes that “The literature of the methodology of science offers us neither a taxonomy of its types of scientific problems, nor any acceptable method of grounding their relative importance.” (p. 13).  But Laudan himself is better at diagnosis than therapy:  his discussion offers us various examples of important problems, but no effective criteria for what it is that constitutes this virtue. In essence, Laudan sees problems as important to the extent that currently fashionable theories disagree about them, but unfortunately this idea shipwrecks circumstance that theories can disagree about smaller issues as well as large ones.

3.	THE CRUX OF IMPORTANCE:  MAKING A DIFFERENCE FOR UNDERSTANDING

	Perhaps the most basic consideration on the subject is that being cognitively important is something rather different from being interesting.  For interest is something subjective, being dependent upon what it is that an individual happens to be interested in.  Interest is person-relativeit is a matter of what someone happens to find interesting.  Scientific importance, by contrast, is a matter of how prominent a role a fact or finding deserves and thereby demands in an adequate exposition of an area of inquiry.  It accordingly doesor should represent an objective issue.
	So understood, the crux of importance is the matter of understandingof the negotiation between fact and mind.  Cognitive importance is a concept that belongs not to abstract logic but to the domain of information management.  The importance of a fact hinges on the answer to the following question: “How large a loss by way of emptiness or confusion would be created for our grasp of a certain domain if we lost our grip on the information at issue.”  Cognitive importance consists in making a difference for adequate understanding.  It is a matter of how large a gap would be left in the body of our presumed knowledge by losing the item at issue.

4.	THE QUANTIFICATION OF SCIENTIFIC IMPORTANCE
	
	But how are we to proceed in assessing the importance of scientific findingsand, above allhow might we be able to measure this?
	To say that one fact or finding is more important than another within the problem-setting of a particular subject-matter domain is to make a judgement of worth or value:  it is to say that it merits a greater expenditure of intellectual resourcesof attention, concern, time, and effort to discover, learn, explain, and teach the item at issue.  Importance, that is to say, is a fundamentally economic conceptone of the pivotal concepts of the rational economy of cognition.
	And so what we have to deal with here is an essentially seismological standard of importance.  It is based on the question "If the concept or thesis at issue were abrogated or abandoned, how large would the ramifications and implications of this circumstance be?  How extensive would be the shocks and tremors reverberating throughout the whole range of what we (presumably) know?
	Along such a line of thought, the "importance" of a factual issues will turn in the final analysis, on how substantial a revision in our body of scientific beliefs is wrought by our grappling with it, that is, the extent to which resolving the question at issue causes geological tremors reverberating across the cognitive landscape.  But two very different sorts of things can be at issue here:  either a mere expansion of our science by additions, or, more seriously, a revision of it that involves replacing some of its members and readjusting the remainder so as to restore overall consistency.  This second sort of change in a body of knowledge, its revision rather than mere augmentation, is, in general, the more significant matter, and a question whose resolution forces revisions is likely to be of greater significance than one which merely fills in some part of the terra incognita of knowledge.
	Importance accordingly is a comparative concept of intellectual economy:  represents the extent to which one thing deserves more attention (time, effort, energy) than another.  The crucial thing for importance is thus inherent in the question of how muchhow prominent a place in the sun does a certain idea or concept deserve.  This is best viewed in the light of the idea of a perfected textbook for the domain at issue.  And importance will here be reflected in space-allocation. To reemphasize:  the crucial determinative factor for increasing importance is the extent of seismic disturbance of the cognitive terrain.  Would we have to abandon and/or rewrite the entire textbook, or a whole chapter, or a section, or a paragraph, or a sentence, or a mere footnote?
	Scientific importance is therefore not a qualitative but a relational feature, a function of how one item (fact or idea etc.) relates to the others.  It is a matter of discursive prominence, of space allocation in the context of systematization:  When something is important, then a lot else depends on its being the way it is, and this is bound to be reflected in how much occasion there is to have recourse to it in the course of an adequate systematization of the domain at issue.  This approach inflects a fundamentally pragmatic perspective.  It views cognitive objects such as concepts, ideas, theories as being tools.  And with any sort of production processbe it physical or cognitivethe importance of a tool lies in how much occasion one has to make use of it.
	The systematic articulation of a cognitive domain is bound to reflect the structure of importance within its boundaries.  In a strongly unified field such as mathematical axiom system virtually everything depends on the axioms:  they will be at work explicitly or obliquely at every stage of the discussion.  But in a field whose information structure is compartmentalized even the most important items will have an importance that is no more than localized.
	We thus arrive at what might be characterized as the ideal space-allocation standard of importance.  A scientific idea, concept, principle, thesis, theory, finding, or fact is important exactly to the comparative extent to which merits space allocation in a perfected exposition of its field.
	Since importance in such a senseas already notedis a fundamentally economic conception, it encounters the economically pivotal factor of limits or finitude.  But now the crucial factor is notas is usualthat of absolute size but rather that of comparative size.  It is a matter of deserving this-and-so much of the overall pie.
	And the cardinal principle in this regard is that no matter how large or small a pie is, there is only one of it to go around.  All we can ever partition of anything is 100% of it:  you can’t get an increase on 100% and exactly 100% of anything is ever available for partition or allocation.
	Now if one fact of finding deserves an additional one percent of the overall pie of attention, concern, etc. then that percent has to come away from something else.  To assign more importance to something is to attribute less importance to another. This being so, it follows that since importance is a matter of percentage shares.  We are playing a zero sum game in attributing importance.

5.	IMPORTANCE IN QUANTITATIVE PERSPECTIVE

	One key mechanism for implementing the idea of importance lies in the general principle that the comparative size of an elite (at a certain level of eliteness) is given by a fixed percentage we have a definite and perspicuous relation between the size of a population (P) and the size of an elite (E).





A HIERARCHY OF ELITES





























The result will be a more or less standard book of some 105 =  100,000 words or 250 pages.





SPACE ALLOCATION	 IN OUR HYPOTHETICAL TREATISE

1 book ~100%		(level 1)

1 chapter ~10%		(level 2)

1 section ~1%		(level 3)		

1 paragraph ~.1% 		(level 4)

1 sentence ~.01%		(level 5)

NOTE:	in general, we have it that one level n unit merits a space allocation of ~ 
___________________________________________________










[1]	1 big (first importance) idea for the book-as-a-whole.

[2]	10 sizeable (second importance) ideas:  one for each chapter.

[3]	100 moderately (third importance) ideas:  one for each section.

[4]	1,000 smallish (fourth importance) ideas:  one for each paragraph.

[5]	10,000 elemental (fifth importance) ideas: one for each sentence.
___________________________________________________








A fact/finding in a given	 If it deserves this percentage of
field has the quality		our total attention/concern














	In our example, then, if a field has N items, then the number of items of quality magnitude n for which it has room is

	#N(n) = N 101-n

With each such nth magnitude finding occupying 103-n percent of the overall space allocated and thereby ideally engrossing a proportionate amount of the overall importance of what is at issue.​[2]​






	N 101-n = 1  or N = 101-n

In other words, the quality depth is fixed at that value of n for which

	n - 1 = log N

So that n = log N + 1 = log 10N

























What we have here is a picture of nested aggregation with findings at a given level of quality in point of importance encompassing a multitude of others at lower levels of quality.
	With this picture in view, it is easy to see how findings a different levels of importance can encompass others by way of consequences, presuppositions, consistency, evidentiation, or the like.
	And, of course, our book analogy could be replicated on a larger scale in such a sequence as:  cognitive domain, discipline, substantive, specialty, problem-area, problem, problem-component.

8.	ESTIMATED VS. ACTUAL AND REAL VS. APPARENT

	The presently contemplated approach to importance is thus comparatively straightforward, being predicated on the idea that the importance of an item within a given domain of deliberations is simply an index of the comparative amount of attention it deserves and thereby of the comparative amount of space that would be devoted to it in a fully adequate exposition of the domain at issue.
	And this idea of domain-relative importance can be readily enlargedat least in theoryby contemplating the idea of an idealized Perfected Scientific Library in which the totality of domains of deliberation would be comprehensively encompassed.  In this Perfected Scientific Library each domain of factual knowledge would be given its canonically definitive systematizationits perfected account in terms of correctness and completeness.
	This model of a Perfected Library isto be suresomething very different from the Borges Library contemplated by the Argentinean polymath Luis Borges.  For the Borges Library is universal:  it deals not only with actuality but seeks to map out the realm of possibility as well.  Accordingly, the vast bulk of its holdings will be works of fiction rather than of science.  Our Perfected Scientific Library, by contrast, concerns itself with fact alone, and leaves fiction aside.
	Of course the constitution of even our more modest library involves a vast amount of idealization.  This simply reflects the fact that it is real rather than putative importance that has been the focus of our concern.  If we want to come down from the fanciful level of idealization that this involves, then we must deal with the reality of actual science libraries in place of that idealization.  We must, in short, take the Hegelian line that the real is rational, and that the reality of things stands surety for that otherwise unattainable idealization.
	For the importance of a question or answer that arises in one state-of-the-art state is something that can only be discovered with hindsight from the vantage point to which the attempts to grapple with it had led us.  In science, apparently insignificant problems (the blue color of the sky, or the anomalous excess of background radiation) can acquire great importance once we have a state-of-the-art that makes them instances of important new effects that instantiate or indicate major theoretical innovations. 
	This being so, it should be clear that when we ourselves actually engage in the business of attributing importance to facts and findings we are providing estimates of importance.  Importance for science as we have it here-and-now is one sort of thingnamely putative or estimated and thus subjective importancewhile real, objective importance is a matter of how matters stand in ideal or perfected science.
	The crucial fact is that progressiveness, insignificance, importance, interest, and the like will all have to be seen in practice as state-of-the-art relative conceptions. And in consequence, as far as we are concerned an item’s cognitive importance must be taken to hinge on the question of how critical it is in securing an adequate understanding of the subject-matter domain at issue as this domain as it stands here and now.  We are, in sum, constrained to proceeding at the level of estimation by dealing with apparent rather than actual importance.
	And it is just here that the element of idealization comes in.  What actually is important is a matter of how things stand in a perfected or completed state of science.  Real as opposed to putative importance involves the element of idealization.  We can, of course, be mistaken on our judgments of importance.  As emphasized above, the wisdom of eventual hindsight is going to have to come into it, so that in actual practice the issue is less one of determination than one of estimation.
	The pivotal role of hindsight makes the fact that apparent importanceimportance as we judge it here and nowis something rather different from real importance:  that is, importance as it will eventually emerge with the progress of science.  The nature of things is such that this difference can never be allowed to drop from sight.
	For all practical purposes, then, it will not be “ideally deserved” space allocation that is our working index of importance but actual space allocations in the actually existing literature.  We have no choice but to work with actual libraries rather than that hypothetical Perfected Library.  And this has some important consequences.

9.	THE ROLE OF CITATION

	For one thing, it means that in terms of availability our most practicable and available approach to importance is through citation studies.  For now the comparative amount of space allocationwhich we can estimate by the number and length of citationswill have to have our effective measure of importance.  This idea can be vindicated as follows.
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	Another perspective on the issue is also instructive.
	The etiquette governing the modus operandi of scientific publication has two critically important features in this regard:  (1) it coordinates findings (ideas, principles, theories) with the names of their discoverers, and (2) it mandates giving people credit for findings that are relevant by way of evidentiation, presumption, or consequence.  The mention of cognitively relevant findings is thus mirrored in the mention of names.  
	This means that short of using citation indices we can also proceed via the name indices of texts and handbooks to effect an estimate of importance.  Such bibliographic aids afford an oblique approach to estimating the importance of findings.  And, of course, no more than an estimate is at issue here.  For it has to be acknowledged that in view of the ever moving boundary lines of the frontiers of knowledge and the shifting ebb and flow of fashions in matters of theorizing have the unavoidable consequence that importance as best we can judge it is not a fixity but an ongoingly varying parameter.
	A good many well-recognized phenomena can be accounted for on this basis.  For example, when there is a “reduction” between fields of investigationwhen field B is “reduced” to field Athere well be a substantial accession of importance to A, since now all those B findings are absorbed by it.  The new found relevancy of B issues to A issues means that all those reference to B’s finding and finders will become credited to A.

10.	  A DIALECTICAL DIGRESSION

	A brief digression into methodology becomes unavoidable at this point. In clarifying the concept of scientific importance, as pretty much anywhere, we confront three issues:

•	What does one mean in calling something an X.

•	What sort of authorizing evidence will standardly entitle one to call something an X.

•	What reason is there to think that the authorizing evidence at issue is adequate to the meaning at hand.

That is, we need to inquire about: (1) meaning or truth conditions, (2) evidentiation or use conditions, and (3) a rationale of adequation that coordinates the second to the first.  Where does the issue of scientific importance stand in this regard?
	This discussion has sought to clarify both the meaning and the use of “scientific importance.”  On the side of meaning conditions we have seen that its crux is a matter of space allocation in ideal science.  On the side of use conditions, by contrast, we have noted that since the realm of the ideal and perfected is inaccessible to us, the use-conditions pivot on the issue of space collection in actual (rather than ideal) science as best it can be assessed through citation indexes and other statistical bibliographic aids.  And the conformity between the two is governed by the realization that actual science as we actually have it is our best available estimative surrogate for the ideal science as that we do not
	“Influential” certainty doesn’t mean “important.”  But nevertheless being influential in our best-available test for importance in science.  Turning blue litmus paper red is certainly not what we mean by “acid.”  But it is nonetheless a pretty good test of acidity.  Of course what we need in such cases is a theory, an explanation, for why the test standard (be it litmus-change or influentiality) deserves to seen as an indicator for the subject-item (acidity/importance).  Can such an account be provided in the present case of influence and importanceby all visible indications the best that is available to us.
	The answer is clearly YES.  The crucial consideration here is that scientists are for the most part rational in matters relating to their workindeed that the scientific community is perhaps our best-available paradigm of the rational society.  And it is a key consequence of this rationality that a thesis or theory just would not belong to actual science if it were not part of our best-available estimate of what belongs to ideal science.
	This stance of seeing the actual as a surrogate for the ideal is of course of limited applicability. In fields other than science we cannot presume a correlation between attention and importance. Take philosophy and even the philosophy of science indeed take as an instance this very issue we are considering, namely that of importance.  Surely this is a not unimportant topicand yet as we saw at the very outset it is one that has attracted virtually no attention at all.
	What is at issue here is an aspect of functionalistic pragmatism.  The point is that science is a particular sort of enterprise with a particular goal structure.  It aims both at the description and explanation of natural phenomena and (no less importantly) of the sort of control over nature that we are able to achieve in experiential situations and in technological applications.  Science is not just chit-chat.  The inherent teleology of the praxis at issue here provides for a goal-oriented a discourse-independent reality circumstance geared to applicative efficacy.  And this underlies the principle that citation-prominence affords a plausible estimate of importance.





^1	  	Larry Laudan, Progress and its Problems (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London:  University of California Press, 1971).
^2	  	One could introduce the idea of a Rousseau Point relative to n as that value of k for which the two elites coincide, i.e., where:  knP =  EQ \R(,P) .
^3	  	A starting point is provided by the books of Derek J. Price, Science Since Babylon (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1975), and Little Science, Big Science (New York, Columbia University Press, 1963),  An updated source is H. W. Holub, Gottfried Tappeiner, and Veronica Eberharter, “The Iron Law of Important Articles,” Southern Economic Journal, vol. 58 (1991), pp. 317-28.  The journal Scientometrics has published a great deal of relevant material in recent years.
^4	  	The mapping of a citation space will of course, need to be doe in a fairly sophisticated way.  If X cites Y and Y cites Z, then X’s thus oblique citation of Z should be allowed to redound to Z’s credit.
^5	  	I am grateful to my colleagues in the University of Pittsburgh’s Center for Philosophy of Science for fruitful discussion of relevant issues.
